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INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS: ARE THE 
BIOLOGICAL PARENTS’ RIGHTS PROTECTED? 
INTRODUCTION 
The number of international adoptions has increased drastically in 
recent years.1 In the United States, the number of international adoptions 
increased from 7,093 in 1990 to nearly 22,884 in 2004.2 The international 
adoption phenomenon began after World War II when Americans became 
aware of the plight that abandoned children in Japan and Europe faced in 
the aftermath of the war.3 “During the 1950s, proxy adoptions, which 
allowed U.S. citizens to adopt in foreign courts in absentia, were the most 
widely publicized means of international adoption.”4 After adoptions from 
Japan and Europe began to slow, the Korean War created a new interest in 
the children of war-torn Asia.”5 Similarly, as a result of the Vietnam War, 
3,267 Vietnamese children were adopted by American parents between 
1963 and 1976. These adoptions effectively ceased at the end of the 
Vietnam War.6 Since the early 1970s, United States citizens increasingly 
have adopted children from Colombia and other Latin American countries; 
however, these adoptions often are motivated by reasons of infertility and 
frustration with attempts at domestic adoption, not by sympathy for the 
victims of war.7  
 1. U.S. Department of State, Immigrant Visas Issued to Orphans Coming to the United States, 
http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/stats/stats_451.html (last visited on Nov. 7, 2005).  
 2. Id. 
 3. The Adoption History Project, Adoption History: International Adoptions, http://darkwing. 
uoregon.edu/~adoption/topics/internationaladoption.htm. “After World War II and during the early 
Cold War, the adoption market globalized as wars, refugee migrations, famines, and other disasters 
made the plight of dependent and orphaned children abroad more visible to Americans.” Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. IRVING J. SLOAN, THE LAW OF ADOPTION AND SURROGATE PARENTING 85 (1988).  
The emergence of intercountry adoption developed as a result of World War II. As American 
forces occupied Germany and Japan they came into contact with children whose families had 
been disrupted. These contacts led to the adoption of German and Japanese children by 
American families . . . From 1948 through 1962 American families adopted 1,845 German 
and Japanese children. Eight hundred and forty Chinese children were also adopted in this 
period. The adoption of many Asian children across racial lines was a previously unthinkable 
practice in most American communities. . . . Between 1953 and 1981 38,128 Korean children 
were adopted by American families. The adoption of Korean children by American families 
continues today. 
Id.  
 6. Id. at 86.  
 7. Id. at 86–87.  
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The reasons why citizens decide to adopt internationally include the 
decline in infants available within the United States for private adoption, 
the contested nature of domestic adoption, and the “bureaucratic hurdles” 
and delays citizens encounter when dealing with adoption agencies.8 
Citizens also adopt internationally because of the undesirable age and 
special needs of adoptive children in the U.S. foster care system and a 
desire to avoid a continuing relationship with the birth parents.9 Adoptive 
parents10 naturally fear having to return their adopted child to the 
biological parents, and therefore feel more comfortable in the international 
situation where the biological parents are overseas.11 Additionally, “a great 
many [adoptive parents] are also motivated by a desire to raise children 
whose lives would otherwise be profoundly marred by poverty, disease, 
war, homelessness, or discrimination in their countries of origin based on 
their ethnoracial background or religion.”12 
Studies show that children who are adopted internationally function 
well in their adoptive countries.13 Almost half of all intercountry adoptions 
 8. Joan H. Hollinger, Intercountry Adoption: A Frontier without Boundaries, in FAMILIES BY 
LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 215 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan H. Hollinger eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
Hollinger, Intercountry Adoption]. See also JOAN H. HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 8-5 (2004) [hereinafter ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE]. 
During the 1990s, several highly publicized contested adoptions have involved the efforts of a 
thwarted birth father to prevent the involuntary termination of his parental rights and block an 
adoption of his biological child by prospective adoptive parents who have had custody of the 
child since shortly after the child’s birth. 
Id. It is likely that the media attention given to these highly contested adoptions has increased the fear 
in prospective adoptive parents that one day the biological parents will reassert their parental rights. 
This fear may be well founded, as “[s]tudies have shown that some biological mothers are unable to 
achieve closure after the adoption has taken place and continue to suffer from the loss of their child for 
many years.” Id. at 13-8. These mothers might be compelled to recover their child if they are unable to 
achieve closure.  
 9. Hollinger, Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, at 215. See also HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 13-9. 
 10. The term “adoptive parents” is used in this Note to refer to the people or person who adopt a 
child. Likewise, the term “biological parents” refers to the people, person or agency who place a child 
up for adoption. 
 11. See Hollinger, Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8. 
 12. Id. at 215. Though there are many positives about intercountry adoptions, there are a few 
potential negative issues related to them as well. See HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 8, at 10-4. These issues include “the potential for exploitation of the poor by the rich, and 
the loss of adoptees of certain connections with their past and ‘their people.’” Id. Furthermore, 
“Countries which allow international adoption typically have laws and regulations that present serious 
difficulties for prospective parents.” Id. 
 13. Hollinger, Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, at 6. Studies conclude that intercountry 
adoptees “function as well as most other adoptive and biologic families in similar socioeconomic 
circumstances. Even children who suffered from untreated illnesses and severe neglect in their early 
lives have been able to recover and flourish.” See also HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 8, 10-16 to 10-18. The empirical studies that have focused on international adoption 
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by U.S. citizens are of children from China and Russia.14 Many children 
are adopted from China because the country’s “strict population control 
policies, endemic poverty, and cultural traditions that favor sons over 
daughters have led to the abandonment of hundreds of thousands of infant 
girls, with the healthiest often made available for adoption by 
foreigners.”15  
Many countries have responded to the increased popularity of 
international adoptions by signing treaties and enacting laws addressing 
the subject. Two of the most important developments in the laws 
governing intercountry adoptions are The Hague Convention on Protection 
of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (the 
Hague Convention)16 and the U.S. Intercountry Adoption Act (IAA).17 The 
provide no basis for concern as to the welfare of the vast majority of the adoptees and their families. 
The studies show them to be 
functioning well, and comparing well on various measures of emotional adjustment with 
other adoptive families, as well as with biologic families. This is rather strikingly positive 
evidence since most international adoptees have had problematic preadoptive histories that 
could be expected to cause difficulties in adjustment. The studies show that adoption has for 
the most part been extraordinarily successful in enabling even those children who have 
suffered extremely severe forms of deprivation and abuse in their early lives, to recover and 
flourish.  
Id. 
 14. Hollinger, Intercountry Adoptions, supra note 8, at 215. 
 15. Id. at 216. See also ChineseAdoptions.org, Chinese Adoptions, http://www.chineseadoptions 
.org/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). 
The world’s fourth largest country (after, Russia, Canada, and the U.S.), China is the nation 
most people turn to when they decide international adoption is the right way to build their 
family. From 1983 to 2002, Americans adopted 33,637 children from China. 
 In the 1950s, Mao Tse-Tung urged his people to have lots of children to strengthen the 
country. The population growth from this edict led the government in the 1970s to be worried 
that China would be unable to feed her citizens. So, the Chinese government implemented the 
One Child Policy in 1979. The goal of this policy was to keep China’s population below 1.3 
billion by the year 2000. Today, China is home to over 1.2 billion people. Couples who 
violate the One Child Policy are subject to fines (equal to three years’ salary!), community 
ostracism, and even jail time.  
 Baby boys are more valued in Chinese society than are baby girls because boys carry on 
the ancestral name, inheritance laws pass property on to sons, and sons are responsible for 
taking care of aged parents. Because of this many couples will abandon baby girls. A 
heartbreakingly cruel choice, yes, and an event that happens all too often—hundreds of 
thousands of baby girls are abandoned every year in China.  
 The babies are abandoned in public places (such as busy streets, railway stations, and in 
front of public buildings) so they will be found quickly. The babies are abandoned as 
infants—usually when they are only a few days old. In addition to little girls, handicapped 
babies and sick babies (both boys and girls) are also abandoned because most parents in 
China don’t have the money to provide for their special needs. Once found, the abandoned 
babies are given a medical exam and then taken to orphanages.  
Id.  
 16. Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry 
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Hague Convention, signed in 1993,18 establishes standards and procedures 
for the intercountry adoption process.19 The focus of the Hague 
Convention is to protect the best interests of the child rather than the rights 
of the biological parents of the child.20 In the IAA, the United States 
implemented the Hague Convention. The IAA became the primary law 
dealing with intercountry adoptions.21  
While the Hague Convention and the IAA cover intercountry adoption 
law, various state laws govern domestic adoptions within the United 
States.22 These state laws focus both on the best interests of the child and 
protect parental interests.23 These state laws allow biological parents a 
specified amount of time to file a motion to reclaim parental rights after a 
domestic adoption proceeding.24 This time period varies from state to 
Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 17. Intercountry Adoption Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–14954 (2004). 
 18. Hague Convention, supra note 16. 
 19. The Hague Convention sets up a framework of mandatory rules and procedures with the 
purpose of protecting the children involved and the interest of their birth parents and adoptive parents. 
Id. 
 20. One of the objects of the Hague Convention is to “ensure that intercountry adoptions take 
place in the best interest of the child . . .” See generally Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 1. See 
HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 10-34. The United Nations, “beginning 
in 1959, has issued Declarations that established legal ‘rights’ for children.” Id. These rights include 
the right to be nurtured in a family unit. Id. Thus, intercountry adoption can be viewed as a way to 
further these rights. Id. at 10-34, 10-35.  
 21. An act “to provide for implementation by the United States of the Hague Convention on 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, and for other purposes.” 
42 U.S.C. § 14901(b)(1). 
 22. Joan H. Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION 
READER 37 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan H. Hollinger eds., 2004) [hereinafter Hollinger, State and Federal 
Adoption Laws] (“For the most part, adoption, like other family relationships, is subject to state rather 
than federal laws.”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. The length of time that adoption statutes allow for a birth parent to revoke consent to the 
adoption varies among the States. See HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 
1A-6. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-13 (2005) (allowing revocation within five days after the birth 
of a child; fourteen days if in the best interest of the child); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23 (2005) (allowing 
revocation within ten days after consent is executed, or after ten day period if in the best interest of the 
child); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(D) (2005) (allowing birth parent to revoke consent when 
consent was obtained by fraud, duress, or undue influence); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-209 (2005) 
(allowing revocation within ten days of consent being signed or within ten days of the child’s birth); 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5 (2005) (allowing revocation within ninety days after giving consent); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-104(7)(a) (2005) (allowing revocation within ninety days of relinquishment 
order, and there is evidence of fraud or duress); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-71, 45a-719 (2005) 
(allowing birth parent to revoke consent if the consent was obtained under fraud, duress, or coercion); 
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 909 (2005) (allowing revocation within sixty days after giving consent); 
D.C. CODE § 32-1007 (2005) (allowing revocation within ten days after giving consent); FLA. STAT. 
§ 63.082 (2005) (allowing birth parent to revoke consent if consent was obtained by fraud or duress); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-26 (2005) (allowing revocation within ten days after signing written consent); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-2(f) (2005) (allowing birth parent to revoke consent if it is in the best interest 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/9
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state.25 Some state laws require biological parents to prove that the 
of the child); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/11 (2005) (allowing revocation within seventy-two hours after 
the birth); IND. CODE § 31-19-10-3 (2005) (allowing birth parent to revoke consent if it is in the best 
interest of the child or if it was obtained by fraud or duress); IOWA CODE § 600A.4 (2005) (allowing 
revocation within ninety-six hours after execution of the release); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2114 (2005) 
(allowing birth parent to revoke consent if the consent was not freely and clearly given); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (2005) (allowing revocation within twenty days after placement approval or 
twenty days after execution of consent); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 1123, 1130 (2005) (allowing 
revocation before the fifth day following the birth of the child); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-
202(D) (2005) (allowing revocation within three days from execution of consent); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 710.29 (2005) (allowing revocation within approximately twenty days); MINN. STAT. §§ 259.24 
subd., 259.47 subd. 7 (2005) (allowing revocation within ten days after consent is executed; then 
denying revocation unless there is fraud); MO. STAT. ANN. § 453.030 (2005) (allowing consent to be 
withdrawn anytime until reviewed and accepted by the judge); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-410 (2005) 
(allowing consent to be revoked if the parent and prospective adoptive parent mutually agree to 
revocation prior to an order terminating parental rights); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.070 (2005) (stating 
that consents executed before the birth of the child or within seventy-two hours after the birth of the 
child are invalid); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:10 (2005) (allowing revocation before the entry of 
the interlocutory decree and if it is in best interest of the child); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46 (2005) 
(allowing revocation within twenty days after notice if the parent’s surrender is not valid and the 
parental rights have not been judicially terminated); N.M. STAT. § 32A-5-21 (2005) (allowing birth 
parents to revoke consent when consent was obtained by fraud); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b (2005) 
(stating that extra-judicial consent may be revoked within forty-five days of its execution); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 48-3-608 (2005) (allowing revocation within twenty-one days following execution if infant is 
less than three months old or in utero, or seven days following execution for any other minor); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 14-15-08 (2005) (allowing revocation before the final order if it is in the best interest of 
child); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.084 (2005) (allowing revocation prior to the interlocutory order; 
prior to entry of final decree after hearing determines that it is in the best interest of child); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-2.7 (2005) (allowing birth parents to revoke consent when consent was obtained 
by fraud or duress, or if it is in the best interest of the child and the child has not been placed for nine 
months); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.312 (2005) (allowing birth parents to revoke consent if there was fraud 
or duress with respect to a material fact); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711 (2005) (allowing revocation until 
the court has entered termination order or adoption decree confirming consent); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
7-1720 (2005) (allowing revocation if in the best interest of the child, or if the consent was given under 
duress or coercion); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-12 (2005) (allowing revocation prior to hearing 
granting adoption petition); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-112 (2005) (allowing revocation within ten days 
of the surrender if petition to adopt has not been filed, or at any time prior to entry of order of 
confirmation of consent); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.104, 161.1035, 162.011 (2005) (allowing 
revocation within eleven days after signing waiver, or at any time before order granting adoption); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-407 (2005) (allowing revocation within twenty-one days after execution of 
consent); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-219.4 (2005) (allowing revocation within fifteen days from execution 
of consent); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.160 (2005) (allowing revocation until the court approves the 
consent; consent may also be revoked one year after approval if there was fraud, duress, or a lack of 
mental competency); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5 (2005) (allowing consent to be revoked if there is mutual 
consent of birth and adoptive parents, or within six months if there was fraud or duress); WIS. STAT. 
§ 48.46 (2005) (allowing revocation within thirty days after the order terminating the parental rights); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-109 (2005) (allowing consent to be revoked if the consent was obtained by 
fraud or duress).  
 25. SCOTT E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 48 (1992). 
Generally, once an order approving an adoption petition has been entered, the adoption 
becomes final and irrevocable after a designated period of time. This period varies from state 
to state. For example, in Delaware a natural parent has up to sixty days to withdraw her 
consent to the adoption, whereas in Texas that consent may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
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parental consent was obtained through fraud or duress in order to revoke 
consent to the adoption of their child.26 Such protection of parents’ rights 
under U.S. domestic law does not exist under Chinese law, the Hague 
Convention, or the IAA.27 
This Note will first evaluate the Hague Convention28 from the 
standpoint of biological parents whose children have been adopted 
internationally. Then, this Note will analyze the IAA from the perspective 
of the biological parents involved in an intercountry adoption. Next, this 
Note will discuss the rights of biological parents in the United States in the 
domestic adoption context. It also will address the rights of foreign 
biological parents whose children are adopted internationally by U.S. 
citizens. Finally, this Note will discuss the adoption laws in China.  
After comparing the provisions in the Hague Convention, the IAA, 
U.S. statutes, and Chinese adoption laws, it is apparent that only the 
United States provides rights for the biological parents after an adoption. 
This limited protection of biological parents’ rights, which allows a 
specified period of time for the parents to revoke consent to the adoption 
of their child, should be part of the intercountry adoption norms. There is 
no right more fundamental than the right to protect and care for your 
child;29 therefore, it is necessary for the laws governing intercountry 
adoptions to contain provisions that protect the biological parent-child 
relationship.  
I. THE HAGUE CONVENTION: ARE THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS’ BEST 
INTERESTS PROTECTED? 
The Hague Convention was enacted to “establish safeguards to ensure 
that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the 
child . . . .”30 While this is a laudable goal, and clearly the child’s interests 
the entry of an order granting the adoption petition. Other states provide that a natural parent 
may not withdraw his or her consent after either entry of an interlocutory adoption order or 
the final adoption decree. States may require the withdrawal of parental consent to be 
supported by good cause. 
Id. at 48 (citation omitted). 
 26. See HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 1A-1. 
 27. See discussion infra Parts I–III.  
 28. Hague Convention, supra note 16. 
 29. See infra note 151. 
 30. Hague Convention, supra note 16, at 1139. The Hague Convention was “convinced of the 
necessity to take measures to ensure that intercountry adoptions are made in the best interests of the 
child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights, and to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or 
traffic in children.” Id. See IRVING J. SLOAN, THE LAW OF ADOPTION AND SURROGATE PARENTING 10 
(1988). “The ‘best interests’ formula has consistently been upheld by the courts and is uniquely an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/9
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should be a primary concern, the Hague Convention’s focus on the child 
undermines the parents’ rights in an intercountry adoption.31  
The discussion of biological parents’ rights in the Hague Convention is 
extremely limited.32 The Hague Convention details specific guidelines for 
the proper form of consent to an adoption and the proper method to obtain 
that consent.33 It states that competent authorities within the biological 
parents’ State (the State of origin) must ensure that “the persons, 
institutions and authorities whose consent is necessary for adoption, have 
been counselled . . . and duly informed of the effects of their consent 
. . . .”34 When discussing the effects of consent to an adoption, these 
competent authorities must inform the relevant parties as to “whether or 
not an adoption will result in the termination of the legal relationship 
between the child and his or her family of origin.”35 Also, the Hague 
Convention specifies that these parties must give “their consent freely, in 
the required legal form, and expressed or evidenced in writing.”36 These 
provisions in the Hague Convention highlight the importance of informed 
consent in intercountry adoptions. The fourth chapter of the Hague 
Convention, entitled “Procedural Requirements in Intercountry Adoption,” 
requires the State of origin to submit a report on the child to the adoptive 
parents’ State (the receiving State).37 This report must include the 
necessary proof of consent for the adoption.38  
Consent is a prerequisite for an intercountry adoption because official 
recognition of an intercountry adoption greatly affects the rights of the 
biological parents, the adoptive parents, and the child.39 Once the adoption 
American contribution to the law of adoption.” Id. 
 31. See infra note 151. 
 32. See Hague Convention, supra note 16. 
 33. Id. art. 4(c)(1). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. art. 4(e)(2). The Hague Convention also requires that “the consent of the mother, where 
required, has been given only after the birth of the child.” Id. art. 4(c)(4). The Hague Convention also 
requires that the authorities of the receiving State must determine “the prospective adoptive parents are 
eligible and suited to adopt” and that they “have been counseled as may be necessary.” Id. art. 5(a),(b). 
 37. Id. art. 15. The Central Authority, a body designated by the State to perform the duties 
required by the Hague Convention, of the State of origin “shall prepare a report including information 
about [the child’s] identity, adoptability, background, social environment, family history, medical 
history including that of the child’s family, and any special needs of the child.” Id. art. 16(1)(a). The 
Central Authority of the State of origin must determine whether the “envisaged placement is in the 
best interests of the child.” Id. art. 16(c). 
 38. The Central Authority of the State of origin must submit “proof that the necessary consents 
have been obtained . . . taking care not to reveal the identity of the mother and the father if, in the State 
of origin, these identities may not be disclosed.” Id. art. 16(2). 
 39. Id. art. 26. An adoption “certified by the competent authority of the State of the adoption as 
having been made in accordance with the Convention shall be recognized by operation of law in the 
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is recognized under the Hague Convention, “the legal parent-child 
relationship between the child and his or her adoptive parents” is in 
effect.40 At this point, the legal relationship between the child and his or 
her biological parents is severed.41 The Hague Convention states: 
In the case of an adoption having the effect of terminating a pre-
existing legal parent-child relationship, the child shall enjoy in the 
receiving State, and in any other Contracting State where the 
adoption is recognized, rights equivalent to those resulting from 
adoptions having effect in each such State.42 
This provision expressly grants the child the same rights that are 
afforded children who are adopted within the receiving State; however, it 
implicitly denies rights granted to the biological parents during the course 
of domestic adoptions in the State of origin.43  
Another provision of remarkable impact on the rights of the biological 
parents states, “[w]here an adoption granted in the State of origin does not 
have the effect of terminating a pre-existing legal parent-child relationship, 
it may . . . be converted into an adoption having such an effect. . . .”44 This 
provision allows the Hague Convention to accomplish its goal of 
establishing permanency in intercountry adoptions by effectively severing 
the legal ties between the biological parents and the child.45 This effect is 
also evident in many other provisions in the Hague Convention.46 
other Contracting States.” Id. art. 23(1). States do not have much leeway when determining whether to 
recognize the adoption. “The recognition of an adoption may be refused in a Contracting State only if 
the adoption is manifestly contrary to its public policy, taking into account the best interests of the 
child.” Id. art. 24. 
 40. Id. art. 26(1)(a). The recognition of an adoption under this Convention gives rise to “parental 
responsibility of the adoptive parents for the child.” Id. art. 26(1)(b). 
 41. Id. art. 26(1)(c). Recognition includes “the termination of a pre-existing legal relationship 
between the child and his or her mother and father, if the adoption has this effect in the Contracting 
State where it was made.” Id. 
 42. Id. art. 26(2) (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. art. 26. The fact that the parents are not mentioned in the text implicitly denies them the 
same rights granted to the children by this article.  
 44. Id. art. 27(1) (emphases added). This article specifies that the adoption can be converted into 
an adoption which terminates the parent-child relationship with the biological parents only if the law 
of the receiving State permits this change and the proper consents have been given. Id. This provision 
of the Hague Convention demonstrates the focus on the child’s interests, and the absence of safeguards 
for the protection of the biological parents’ rights.  
 45. Id. introduction. 
 46. See id. For example, article 30 states that the authorities of the State of origin “shall ensure 
that information held by them concerning the child’s origin, in particular information concerning the 
identity of his or her parents, as well as the medical history, is preserved.” Id. art. 30(1) (emphasis 
added). This provision encourages the State of origin to withhold the identity of the biological parents 
from the adoptive parents and “preserve” it for the child to have in the future. Furthermore, article 29 
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II. THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION ACT: HOW THE U.S. IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION PRECLUDES PROTECTION OF THE 
BIOLOGICAL PARENTS’ RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States enacted the IAA in 200047 in order to implement the 
Hague Convention.48 Following the Hague Convention, the IAA focuses 
on the “children’s best interests.”49 One of Congress’ purposes in enacting 
the IAA was to assist U.S. citizens adopting children from abroad;50 
however, implicit in the act is a denial of the rights of the biological 
parents.51  
In order for an intercountry adoption to take effect under the IAA, 
certain procedures must be followed, including the issuance of certificates 
of recognition.52 The recognition provisions of the IAA detail the legal 
effect of these certificates.53 The adoptive parent receives the certificate 
only after the adoption has been granted, proper notification has been 
received from the central authority in the State of origin, and the 
notes that the authorities of the State of origin “shall ensure that the child or his or her representative 
has access to such information, under appropriate guidance, insofar as is permitted by the law of that 
State.” Id. art. 29. This vaguely-worded provision may be interpreted to forbid the child or adoptive 
parents from ever being able to obtain that “preserved” information. The language of this provision 
does not guarantee that the identity of the biological parents would be available to the adoptive parents 
or the child, even if the biological parents wanted that information to be shared. It is also not clear 
from the language of the provision whether the biological parents have any right to obtain the 
identities of the adoptive parents.  
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 14901. 
 48. Id. (“An Act to provide for implementation by the United States of the Hague Convention on 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.”). 
 49. Id. § 14901(b)(7). There are three purposes of the IAA: 
to provide for implementation by the United States of the Convention . . . to protect the rights 
of, and prevent abuses against, children, birth families, and adoptive parents involved in 
adoptions (or prospective adoptions) subject to the Convention, and to ensure that such 
adoptions are in the children’s best interests, and to improve the ability of the Federal 
Government to assist United States citizens seeking to adopt children from abroad and 
residents of other countries party to the Convention seeking to adopt children from the United 
States. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. § 14901(b)(3). As noted, the third stated purpose of the IAA is “to improve the ability of 
the Federal Government to assist United States citizens seeking to adopt children from abroad and 
residents of other countries party to the Convention seeking to adopt children from the United States.” 
Id. § 14901(b) (emphases added). The language of the third purpose of the IAA clarifies that its 
intention is primarily to protect U.S. citizens. The only intended assistance to foreign naturals arises 
when foreign citizens adopt a child from the United States.  
 51. Id. § 14901. The stated purposes of the IAA express no intention to protect the rights of the 
biological parents in the foreign country. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 14931. 
 53. Id. 
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requirements of the Hague Convention and the IAA have been met.54 The 
adoption is recognized as final by the United States after the certificate has 
been issued.55  
Paralleling the Hague Convention,56 a central concern of the IAA is the 
consent required for an adoption to be considered valid.57 The IAA states 
that the biological parents must freely give their “written irrevocable 
consent to the termination of their legal relationship with the child, and to 
the child’s emigration and adoption.”58 The Attorney General must be 
satisfied “that the purpose of the adoption is to form a bona fide parent-
child relationship, and the parent-child relationship of the child and the 
natural parents has been terminated.”59  
The rights of the biological parents end once the parent-child 
relationship has been terminated by following the proper procedures for an 
international adoption and obtaining valid consent.60 As the IAA markedly 
states, at that point “no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any such 
child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, 
privilege, or status under this Act.”61 This statement clearly indicates that 
the biological parents have no parental rights after the adoption is 
recognized.62 
 54. Id. With respect to the issuance of certificates, the IAA provides: 
The Secretary of State shall, with respect to each Convention adoption, issue a certificate to 
the adoptive citizen parent domiciled in the United States that the adoption has been granted 
or, in the case of a prospective adoptive citizen parent, that legal custody of the child has been 
granted to the citizen parent for purposes of emigration and adoption, pursuant to the 
Convention and this Act, if the Secretary of State—receives appropriate notification from the 
central authority of such child’s country of origin; and has verified that the requirements of 
the Convention and this Act have been met with respect to the adoption.  
Id. § 14931(a)(1). 
 55. Id. § 14931(a)(2). 
 56. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 57. See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 58. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(G)(i)(II) (2004). According to the IAA, “the child’s natural parents (or 
parent, in the case of a child who has one sole or surviving parent because of the death or 
disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, the other parent)” must freely give their written 
consent to terminate their legal relationship with the child, if these biological parents still have legal 
custody. Id.  
 59. Id. § 1101(b)(1)(G)(IV). 
 60. Id. § 1101(b)(1)(G). 
 61. Id. § 1101(b)(1)(G)(V). 
 62. Id. 
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III. ADOPTION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS OF BIOLOGICAL 
PARENTAL RIGHTS  
Adoption law in the United States has evolved throughout its lengthy 
history.63 While domestic adoptions are governed by state law, the IAA 
controls intercountry adoptions.64 Many states also have laws governing 
international adoptions, which are recognized in addition to the IAA.65  
Within the United States, state laws concerning domestic adoptions 
vary greatly.66 These laws are neither uniform, nor are they consistently 
applied.67 However, there is a general consensus among the states on the 
 63. See generally SLOAN, supra note 5, at 5–10 (outlining a historical background of adoption). 
“Our jurisprudence was largely acquired by inheritance from England. The English have an 
inordinately high regard for blood lineage and therefore the practice of adoption never acquired a 
foothold there.” Id. at 8. “Since the English common law did not know true adoption, there was no 
common law precedent for it in this country and the introduction of the practice in the United States 
was, therefore, inhibited here.” Id. at 8–9. “One influence on United States adoption law can be traced 
to the Spanish and French law” which was based on Roman civil law. Id. at 9. “The earliest adoption 
statute is variously reported to be that of Mississippi in 1846 and Massachusetts in 1851.” Id. U.S. 
statutes differ from the Roman Law in that “the primary concern of American laws was the welfare of 
the child rather than concern for the continuity of the adopter’s family.” Id. at 10. In fact, one of the 
important developments in U.S. adoption law is that most states now require “a thorough investigation 
before placing a child for adoption.” Id. See also SLOAN, supra note 5, at 83–91 (detailing the history 
of intercountry adoptions in the United States).  
 64. See SHAWN C. STEVENS, INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION: A LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE (2004). 
The processes and laws governing intercountry adoptions differ from the state laws that control 
domestic adoptions. 
The typical international adoption proceeds as follows: (1) the prospective parents decide to 
adopt; (2) the prospective parents fill out the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(BCIS) Form I-600A and have a home study done; (3) the BCIS approves the I-600A; (4) the 
foreign child is identified; (5) the prospective parents travel overseas and adopt the child; (6) 
BCIS Form 1-600 is filed on behalf of the child; (7) the I-600 is approved if the child is an 
orphan; (8) finally, the child immigrates to the United States and automatically receives 
citizenship. 
Id. The intercountry adoption process usually takes between six months and two years. Id. at 3. 
“Prospective parents in an international adoption typically will not have contact with the biological 
family. In contrast, in domestic adoptions, there is a potential for conflict to arise between birth parents 
and prospective adoptive parents.” Id.  
 65. Id. at 9. Individual state laws governing international adoptions fall into one of three 
categories: (1) states that grant full effect and recognition to foreign adoption decrees; (2) states that 
allow re-adoption for the validation of the adoption; and (3) states that have no statutory provisions. 
See id. at 9–40 (listing applicable statutory language of each state concerning intercountry adoption, if 
available).  
 66. Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, supra note 22, at 37. 
 67. Id. There is a historical controversy over whether adoption laws should “be ‘strictly 
construed’ so as to protect birth parents and their children from being separated . . . or ‘liberally’ 
construed to recognize ties between children and the ‘legal strangers’ who are committed to . . . 
providing them with a permanent loving family.” Id. at 37. In 1994, the Uniform Adoption Act 
[hereinafter UAA] was proposed with the purpose of achieving more uniformity in adoption laws. Id. 
at 38. Unfortunately, the UAA has not lived up to this purpose. “[S]ome of the UAA provisions have 
been criticized as too favorable to adoptive parents, others as too protective of birth parents’ rights 
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basic legal requirements for adoptions.68 For example, a majority of states 
require an adoptive parent to be at least twenty-one years old.69 Also, all 
states require that “a court order based on a finding that the essential 
requirements for the creation of an adoptive parent-child relationship” be 
granted, and that the adoption be in the best interests of the child.70 There 
are six legal prerequisites for adoption: parental consent from the birth 
parents, suitable adoptive parents, adoption must be a gift not a bargained 
exchange, the adoptive relationship replacing the birth family relationship, 
confidentiality, and permanence.71  
Consent is fundamental to a legal adoption in U.S. state law, just as in 
the Hague Convention and the IAA.72 “A court cannot approve an 
adoption without proof that the child’s birth parents have executed 
voluntary and informed consents, or, alternatively, that their parental 
. . . .” Id. Under the UAA, when an adoption decree is final, “the legal relationship . . . between each of 
the adoptee’s former parents and the adoptee terminates.” Proposed Uniform Adoption Act of 1994, in 
FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 77 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Hollinger eds., 2004). Under 
the proposed UAA there would be no waiting period in which the biological parents could revoke 
consent to the adoption. Id. 
 68. See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 69. SLOAN, supra note 5, at 11. Many statutes merely specify that the adoptive parent must be an 
adult; while others set a minimum age requirement of 21 years old. A few states allow “any person” or 
“any resident” to adopt. Id. Some states require a specific age difference between the adoptive parent 
and child. Id.  
 70. Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, supra note 22, at 38.  
 71. Id. at 38–39. See also MADELYN FREUNDLICH & LISA PETERSON, WRONGFUL ADOPTION: 
LAW, POLICY, & PRACTICE 11 (1998) (discussing the increase in litigation instigated by adoptive 
families who were not provided with information about the child’s “physical, emotional, or 
developmental problems or with critical background information about the child’s birth family and 
history” before deciding to adopt the child). “[C]ourts have recognized a duty to disclose known 
material information about a child’s health and social background to prospective adoptive families.” 
Id. “Wrongful adoption” suits have recently been considered for international adoptions suits as well, 
due to the increase in the number of international adoptions and “the incidence of serious health, 
emotional and developmental problems among children adopted from abroad.” Id. at vi. “[T]he nature 
and scope of wrongful adoption liability” is unclear especially as it pertains to intercountry adoptions. 
Id. at 77.  
 72. See infra notes 73–83 and accompanying text. See also adoption.com, Consent to Adoption, 
http://laws.adoption.com/statutes/consent-to-adoption.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). 
Consent plays a pivotal role in all adoptions; all adoptions are based upon the consent of 
persons or agencies legally empowered with the care or custody of the child. Consent refers to 
the agreement by a parent, or a person or agency acting in place of a parent, to relinquish the 
child for adoption and to release all rights and duties with respect to that child. In most States, 
the consent must be in writing and either witnessed and notarized or executed before a judge 
or other designated official. State legislatures have developed a range of provisions designed 
to ensure protection for children to prevent unnecessary and traumatic separations from their 
adult caretakers; for birth parents to prevent uninformed, hurried, or coerced decisions; and 
for adoptive parents to prevent anxiety about the legality of the adoption process.  
Id. 
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rights were terminated.”73 The clear purposes behind the consent 
requirements for adoptions are “to protect children from unnecessary and 
traumatic separations from the adults who are caring for them, to protect 
biological parents from hurried, uninformed or coerced decisions, and to 
protect adoptive parents from needless anxiety about the legality of the 
adoption.”74 The consent provisions in the adoption laws “enable 
biological parents to voluntarily relinquish their rights, to relieve 
themselves of their obligations and to permanently sever all ties to their 
offspring.”75  
The necessity of the consent of parents and guardians differs depending 
on their biological connection and legal relationship to the child.76 In 
 73. Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, supra note 22, at 39. “When a parent 
relinquishes a child to a licensed agency, or the agency acquires custody of the child after a court 
orders the involuntary termination of parental rights, the agency’s consent to a proposed adoption is 
necessary.” Id. See also SLOAN, supra note 5, at 2. “[T]he consents of the biological parents are 
usually required unless they are deceased or have legally relinquished all rights to the child, or are 
otherwise excused or excluded under some specific statutory provision.” Id. A valid adoption can 
require the consent of three types of people: the child (when the child is old enough; usually at least 
age fourteen), the natural parents, and the legal guardian or agency if the natural parents are deceased 
or their rights to the child have been surrendered. Id. at 26. Until the landmark Supreme Court decision 
in Stanley v. Illinois the consent of the biological mother was sufficient and the unwed biological 
father’s rights were ignored. Id. at 26–27 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)). In Caban v. 
Mohammed, the Supreme Court held that a state does not have to allow a father, who has made no 
attempt to assert his parental rights, the ability to veto the adoption of his child. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
Thus, those parents “who are situated differently may be treated differently.” SLOAN, supra note 5, at 
28. The Supreme Court clarified this line of jurisprudence in Lehr v. Robertson, in which it held that 
notice to the unwed biological father is not required if he has not “demonstrated a ‘custodial, personal, 
or financial’ relationship with his child.” Id. at 29 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 
(1983)). The father cannot withhold consent to the adoption of his child if he has not “previously 
attempted to develop a relationship with his illegitimate child.” Id. Sloan notes that the consent of the 
biological parents is not required if “they have neglected, abandoned, or deserted the child; or have 
been deprived of custody judicially, or have voluntarily surrendered the child to a welfare or social 
agency; where they have been deprived of their civil rights or imprisoned for a felony; or are alcoholic 
abusers.” Id. at 30. In addition, the biological parents’ consent is not necessary if they are unknown or 
missing. Id.  
 74. HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 2-1 (2003). Consent is 
necessary but not sufficient, for an adoption; the court must also determine if the adoption is in the 
child’s best interests. Id. at 2-6. 
 75. Id. Due to the permanency and finality of an adoption “for children and for their biological 
parents, courts will not approve an adoption before ascertaining whether the requisite parental consents 
are ‘voluntary and informed,’ or, alternatively, whether the parents’ behavior manifest such a profound 
disregard for parental responsibility that their consent may be dispensed with.” Id. at 2-7. Hollinger 
notes that due to the historical deference to parental autonomy, “[a]bsent a voluntary or provable 
forfeiture of parental rights and duties, the state has no license to remove children from their parents in 
order to seek a ‘better’ placement.” Id. at 2-8.  
 76. See id. See also adoption.com, supra note 72. 
In all States, the birth mother and the birth father, if he has properly established paternity, 
hold the primary right of consent to adoption of their child. Either one or both parents may 
have these rights terminated for a variety of possible reasons, including abandonment, failure 
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general, the biological mothers and the men they are married to are legally 
entitled to the right of consent concerning their child’s adoption.77 In 
addition to the requirement of consent, there are also statutory guidelines 
for the timing of obtaining consent.78 Some exceptions to the requirement 
that a parent must consent to an adoption exist.79 However, the courts 
to support the child, mental incompetence, or a finding of parental unfitness due to abuse or 
neglect. When neither birth parent is available to give consent, the responsibility can fall to 
other legal entities, such as: [a]n agency which has custody of the child; [a]ny person who has 
been given custody; [a] guardian or guardian ad litem; [t]he court having jurisdiction over the 
child; [a] close relative of the child; [a] best friend of the child appointed by the court.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 77. See HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 2-8. “Biological mothers 
and the men married to them at or around the time they give birth have always been entitled to the 
legal right to consent to, or to veto, their child’s adoption.” Id. Divorced fathers, unwed fathers, fathers 
by artificial insemination, and parents whose rights have been terminated involuntarily, are not 
afforded equal protection under the consent laws. Id. at 2-8, 2-9. “Generally, a child may not be 
adopted without the consent of each living parent if the parents were married to each other when their 
child was conceived or born.” Id. at 2-11. Biological fathers who were not married to the mother are 
not entitled to the right to consent to an adoption of their child; rather, they must earn the right by 
“formally acknowledging or establishing paternity of the child, or alternatively, by proving that they 
meet certain statutory criteria intended to ‘establish that their relationship to their child is sufficiently 
“parental” to warrant treating them as if they had been married to the mother at the time of the birth,’ 
in order to earn their parental rights.” Id. at 2-14. Hollinger also notes that “[i]f one parent is deceased 
or has been deprived of the right to consent as a result of a voluntary surrender or an involuntary 
termination proceeding, the consent of the other parent is required to effectuate an adoption.” Id. at 2-
12  
 78. See id. at 2-80 (discussing the time in which consent may be obtained from the mother and 
from the father). See also adoption.com, supra note 72. 
Approximately 46 States and the District of Columbia specify in statute when a birth parent 
may execute a consent to adoption. Birth fathers can generally execute consent at any time, 
while a birth mother can usually only execute consent after the birth of the child. Sixteen 
States and the Northern Mariana Islands allow consent at any time after the birth, while 28 
States require a waiting period before a consent can be executed. The shortest waiting periods 
are 12 and 24 hours, and the longest, in 15 States are 72 hours, or 3 days. Only two States 
(Alabama and Hawaii) allow the birth mother to consent before the birth of her child; 
however, the decision to consent must be reaffirmed after the birth. The manner in which 
consent can be executed varies considerably from State to State. In some States, consent may 
be executed by a written statement witnessed and/or notarized by a notary public. Other 
States may require an appearance before a judge, or the filing of a petition of relinquishment. 
Some States require that the parent be provided with counseling and have his/her rights and 
the legal effect of relinquishment explained to him/her prior to consent. In those cases where 
custody of the child has previously been placed with an agency, the head of the agency may 
sign an affidavit of consent. In most States, a birth parent who is a minor is treated no 
differently than other birth parents. However, in some States, the minor parent must be 
provided with separate counsel prior to execution, or a guardian ad litem must be appointed to 
either review or execute the consent. In other States and Guam, the consent of the minor’s 
parents must be obtained.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 79. See id. When a state seeks to protect a child from abusive, neglectful, and otherwise 
incapable parents, the parents’ rights can be terminated involuntarily. At that point, a state agency is 
typically empowered to consent to the child’s adoption. Id. As previously noted, in most 
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carefully scrutinize these statutory provisions for the waiver or forfeiture 
of the right to consent, because the provisions revoke a fundamental right 
of biological parents.80  
Unlike laws dealing with intercountry adoption, under which the 
biological parents have no rights after the recognition of the adoption,81 
the biological parents in domestic adoptions in the United States are 
afforded an important positive right: the right to a waiting period in which 
they may revoke their consent to the adoption.82 Consent is deemed invalid 
when revoked, and when it was obtained by fraud, duress, or other 
wrongful conduct.83 
circumstances, the unwed father’s consent is not required because he does not have the same rights as 
the biological mother. Id. at 2-82. Even in situations where the “biological mother has never executed 
a consent, or has executed one as a result of duress or fraud, she may nonetheless be precluded from 
regaining custody of her child, if the adopters or an agency can prove that independent grounds exist 
which justify dispensing with her consent. Id. at 2-83.  
 80. Id.  
Because adoption severs all legal ties between biological parents and their children and 
because “the liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their 
child” is a fundamental right, requiring complete due process safeguards, courts traditionally 
are reluctant to terminate the rights of biological parents without their consent. 
Id. at 2-84, 2-84.1. The traditional grounds for waiving parental consent in most adoption statutes 
include: abandonment, death of a biological parent, involuntary termination of parental rights, 
incompetency of parent, imprisonment for specified felonies, unfitness, and failure to support the child 
despite the ability to do so. Id. at 2-86, 2-87. The state usually bears the burden of proving that 
termination is justified. Id. at 2-87. 
 81. See supra discussion in Parts I and II. 
 82. See supra note 24. The length of the waiting period varies by state, and there is no consensus 
as to what constitutes an appropriate or adequate waiting period.  
 83. HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 2-129. “A contest to an 
adoption can arise when a biological parent either alleges that no consent to the adoption was ever 
given, or attempts to exercise a right of revocation.” Id. at 8-1. See also adoption.com, supra note 72.  
Adoption is meant to create a permanent and stable home for a child; therefore, a validly 
executed relinquishment and consent to adopt is intended to be final and irrevocable. As a 
result, approximately five States, the District of Columbia, American Samoa and the Virgin 
Islands make no provisions for revocation of consent, and approximately 23 States and Puerto 
Rico only allow revocation when there are specific circumstances—generally when there is 
strong evidence of fraud, duress, undue influence, coercion, or misrepresentation. In other 
States, provisions are made for withdrawal or revocation of consent under specific 
circumstances or within specified time limits. Several States have specific time periods, 
generally ranging from three to 21 days, when revocation is allowed for any reason. In other 
States, revocation requires the mutual consent of the adopting family or a court finding that 
revocation is in the best interest of the child. In some States, the issue of consent may be 
reconsidered if an adoptive placement is not made with a specified family or within a specific 
period of time. In all cases, consent becomes final and irrevocable once a final decree of 
adoption has been issued by the court. 
Id.  
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IV. ADOPTION LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
In 1991, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
approved the Adoption Law of the People’s Republic of China (the 
Adoption Law (P.R.C.)).84 The Committee revised the Adoption Law 
(P.R.C.) in 1998.85 The Adoption Law (P.R.C.) was enacted to “protect the 
lawful adoptive relationship and to safe-guard the rights of parties 
involved” in the adoption.86 It states that the adoption must be in the 
“interest of the upbringing and growth of adopted minors,”87 which is 
equivalent to the “best interest of the child” language contained in the 
Hague Convention and the IAA.88 The Adoption Law (P.R.C) also seeks 
to safeguard “the lawful rights and interests of both adoptees and 
adopters.”89  
Just as U.S. law contains certain threshold requirements,90 adoptive 
parents in China also have to meet certain requirements. First, the adoptive 
parents must be childless and “capable of rearing and educating the 
adoptee.”91 In addition, they cannot suffer from a disease that would 
render them unfit to adopt.92 Finally, they must be at least thirty years 
old.93 Under the Adoption Law (P.R.C.), only one child, male or female, 
may be adopted by any set of adoptive parents.94 Furthermore, Adoption 
 84. Adoption Law (P.R.C.) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 
1991, effective Dec. 29, 1991), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.asp?db=1&id= 
995&keyword=adoption.law [hereinafter Adoption Law (P.R.C.)].  
 85. Id. The Adoption Law (P.R.C.) was “[a]dopted at the 23rd Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress on December 29, 1991.” It was revised “in 
accordance with the Decision on Revising the Adoption Law of the People’s Republic of China 
adopted at the 5th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 
November 4, 1998.” Id.  
 86. Id. art. 1. 
 87. Id. art. 2.  
 88. See Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 1-3; 42 U.S.C. § 14901(b)(2). 
 89. Adoption Law (P.R.C.), supra note 84, art. 2. The law is designed to protect the rights of the 
children being adopted and the adoptive parents; yet, the biological parents’ rights are neglected. The 
article further states that the adoption must be predicated on “principles of equality and voluntariness, 
and not in contravention of social morality.” Id.  
 90. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
 91. Adoption Law (P.R.C.), supra note 84, art. 6. There are two exceptions to the childlessness 
requirement. First, “[a]n overseas Chinese, in adopting a child belonging to a collateral relative by 
blood of the same generation and up to the third degree of kinship, may even be not subject to the 
adopter’s childless status.” Id. art. 7. Second, orphaned, disabled, or abandoned children can be 
adopted regardless of whether the adoptive parents are childless. Id. art. 11.  
 92. Id. art. 6.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. art. 8. There is an exception to the one-child-only rule, that orphans, disabled children, 
abandoned infants, and children whose parents cannot be ascertained or found and who are under the 
care of a social welfare institution may be adopted regardless of whether the adoptive parents are 
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Law (P.R.C.) requires that parents “act in concert” when placing their 
child for adoption or when choosing to adopt a child into their family.95  
It is not clear from the Adoption Law (P.R.C.) what form of consent is 
required for a valid adoption.96 The law simply states that the adoption 
shall take place on “a voluntary basis.”97 The Adoption Law (P.R.C.) does 
not specify what constitutes a “voluntary basis”; therefore, it is not clear 
whether written consent or other documentation is needed to certify that 
the adoption was voluntary.98 In article 13, the Adoption Law (P.R.C.) 
states that “[w]here a guardian intends to place an orphaned minor up for 
adoption, the guardian shall obtain the consent of the person who has 
obligations to support the orphan.”99 Thus, the Adoption Law (P.R.C.) 
requires consent, but it does not specify the form of that consent.100  
The Adoption Law (P.R.C.) requires registration of the adoption with 
the civil affairs department to officially establish the adoptive 
relationship.101 After the date the adoptive relationship is established, the 
same legal provisions, rights, and duties apply to the relationship between 
adoptive parents and children, as would apply in a legal relationship 
between biological parents and children.102 As a consequence, “[t]he rights 
and duties in the relationship between an adopted child and his or her 
parents and other close relatives shall terminate with the establishment of 
the adoptive relationship.”103  
The Adoption Law (P.R.C.) addresses the possible ways to terminate 
an adoptive relationship in several different provisions.104 One such 
provision states that in order to terminate the adoptive relationship, the 
childless and regardless of how many children they adopt. Id. 
 95. Id. art. 10. 
 96. See id. art. 11. 
 97. Id. art. 11 (“Adoption of a child and the placing out of the child for the adoption shall both 
take place on a voluntary basis. Where the adoption involves a minor aged 10 or more, the consent of 
the adoptee shall be obtained.”).  
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. art. 13 (emphasis added).  
 100. Id. arts. 11, 13. This is markedly different from the specific provisions for consent found in 
the Hague Convention, the IAA, and U.S. state law. See supra discussion in Parts I–III. 
 101. Adoption Law (P.R.C.), supra note 84, art. 15 (“The adoption shall be registered with the 
civil affairs department of the people’s government at or above the county level. The adoptive 
relationship shall be established as of the date of registration.”). The Adoption Law (P.R.C.) also 
allows parties to enter into a private adoption contract. Id. However, the adoption must still be 
registered with the civil affairs department in order for the adoptive relationship to be recognized. Id. 
 102. Id. art. 23. The article also stipulates that “the legal provisions governing the relationship 
between children and close relatives of their parents shall apply to the rights and duties in the 
relationship between adopted children and close relatives of the adoptive parents.” Id. 
 103. Id. art. 23. 
 104. See infra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p211 Szejner book pages.doc  2/17/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
228 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 5:211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
adoptive parents and the biological parents must agree to terminate the 
adoption, and the child must consent if he or she is over the age of ten.105 
In addition, the biological parents may demand termination of the adoption 
if the adoptive parents “fail[] to perform the duty of rearing the adoptee or 
commit[] maltreatment, abandonment, or other acts of encroachment upon 
the lawful rights of the minor adopted child.”106 Adoption Law (P.R.C.) 
also states that an adopted child who is an adult and the adoptive parents 
may terminate the adoptive relationship if the relationship “deteriorates to 
such a degree that living together in the same household becomes 
impossible.”107 The Adoption Law (P.R.C.) has additional special 
provisions for cases involving an adult adopted child.108  
In the case of a termination of the adoptive relationship, the “rights and 
duties in the relationship between the child and his or her parents and their 
close relatives shall be restored automatically.”109 If it is the biological 
parents who request the termination of the adoption, the adoptive parents, 
under the Adoption Law (P.R.C.), “may demand an appropriate 
compensation from the [biological] parents for the living and education 
expenses paid during the period of adoption, except if the adoptive 
relationship is terminated on account of the maltreatment or desertion of 
the adopted child by the adoptive parents.”110 It is not clear from the 
Adoption Law (P.R.C.) whether or not there is a limited time period in 
which the biological parents may make a request for the termination of the 
adoptive relationship.111 The Adoption Law (P.R.C.) also affects the rights 
 105. Adoption Law (P.R.C.), supra note 84, art. 26. 
 106. Id. This article also states that if the adoptive parents and the biological parents are not able 
to reach an agreement about the termination of the adoptive relationship, then a suit may be brought by 
the parties in a People’s Court. Id.  
 107. Id. art. 27. The parties may terminate this relationship by agreement or by bringing a suit in a 
People’s Court.  
 108. Id. art. 29. Note that in the case of an adult adopted child, the rights and duties are restored to 
the biological family only if it is decided through consultation that they be restored. Id.  
Upon termination of an adoptive relationship, an adult adopted child who has been reared by 
the adoptive parents shall provide an amount of money to support the adoptive parents who 
have lost ability to work and are short of any source of income. If the adoptive relationship is 
terminated on account of the maltreatment or desertion of the adoptive parents by the grown-
up adopted child, the adoptive parents may demand a compensation from the adopted child 
for the living and education expenses paid during the period of adoption. 
Id. art. 30. 
 109. Id. art. 29. As the rights and duties return to the biological family, the rights and duties of the 
adoptive family are terminated. Id. The Adoption Law (P.R.C.) also mandates that the parties register 
the termination of the adoptive relationship with a civil affairs department. Id. art. 28. 
 110. Id. art. 30. 
 111. See id. 
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of biological parents by forbidding them from bearing another child after 
having placed a child for adoption.112  
V. ANALYSIS 
The rights of biological parents are fundamental and deserve the utmost 
protection by the law.113 The Hague Convention, the IAA, U.S. adoption 
statutes, and the Adoption Laws (P.R.C.) have failed to protect the 
fundamental rights of the biological parents in intercountry adoptions.114 
The majority of U.S. state statutes have a provision granting the biological 
parents the option of revoking their consent to the adoption of their child 
in a domestic adoption.115 The Hague Convention, the IAA, and the 
Adoption Laws (P.R.C.), on the other hand, do not provide for this right.116 
Rather, these laws appear to affirmatively deny the biological parents any 
rights.117  
One could argue that limiting the biological parents’ rights is necessary 
in order to create permanency in the adoptive relationships and protect the 
adoptive parents and children from the upheavel which inevitably arises 
from assertions of biological parents’ rights.118 However, U.S. state law 
reasonably protects the fundamental rights of the biological parents by 
allowing them a limited amount of time to file a motion to revoke consent 
to their child’s adoption within the United States.119 There are no statutes 
that unreasonably allow the biological parents an indefinite amount of 
time to re-assert their parental rights.120  
A major appeal of intercountry adoptions is that there is a lack of 
biological parental rights following the adoption.121 Thus, there is no fear 
in the minds of the adoptive parents that three months after the adoption, 
the biological parents from the foreign country will be knocking on the 
front door to reclaim their child.122 Intercountry adoptions should be 
encouraged because they result in the placement of these orphan children 
 112. Id. art. 19. 
 113. See infra note 151. 
 114. See supra discussion in Parts I–IV. 
 115. See supra note 24. 
 116. See Hague Convention, supra note 16; 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–14954; Adoption Law (P.R.C.), 
supra note 84. 
 117. See supra discussion in Parts I–III. 
 118. See Hollinger, Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, at 37–38. 
 119. See supra note 24. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Hollinger, Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, at 215–16.  
 122. Id. 
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into loving homes.123 However, to protect the fundamental rights of 
biological parents124 in the intercountry adoption context, the international 
adoption laws should contain provisions similar to those provisions in U.S. 
state law that allow for revocation of consent during a limited period of 
time.125  
CONCLUSION 
There is no end in sight to the increasing popularity of intercountry 
adoptions.126 There are varied reasons why people continue to choose to 
adopt internationally instead of domestically.127 While there are opponents 
to the practice of intercountry adoption,128 there are just as many 
 123. See supra note 9. See also HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 10-
20. Results of studies show that “[a] permanent adoptive family is vastly preferable from the child’s 
perspective to even the best foster or institutional care. Most of the children without permanent 
families in the poor countries of the world are not living in ‘the best’ temporary care situations, but 
rather in situations ranging from seriously inadequate to desperate.”  
 124. See infra note 151. 
 125. See supra note 24.  
 126. See supra note 1. See also HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 10-
7. 
The numbers continue to rise, and are expected to exceed 20,000 in 2002–2003, with most 
children now coming from China, Russia, South Korea, Guatemala, other former Soviet 
countries and many southeast Asian countries . . . . The increase in international adoption is 
related to the decrease in recent decades in the number of domestic children available for 
adoption and the number of healthy infants available . . . . International adoption is no longer 
a phenomenon keyed to wartime crises. The demand in the United States is steady and 
increasing. 
Id. 
 127. See supra notes 8–9. See also HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 
10-10. For those with limited opportunities to adopt within the United States due to their marital status, 
age, or other reasons, intercountry adoption may be the best solution. “Despite restrictions of many 
countries’ adoption laws, the wide cultural variations in notions about appropriate adoptive parent 
screening leave at least some countries open to almost all adoptive applicants.” Id. See also Foreign 
Adoptions, http://www.foreignadoptions.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2006). “Adopting from a foreign 
country was a choice made by more than 21,000 American families in 2003. Adoptions from other 
countries has grown over 300% over the course of the last decade.” Id. “While the costs for 
international adoption can often be very high, many feel that the process is more predictable than 
domestic adoption.” Id. Some other advantages “include less stringent age restrictions for adopting 
parents and minimal, if any, risk that an adoption won’t move through to completion.” Id.  
 128. See HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 10-30. Leaders often 
condemn the practice of international adoptions because “[i]t is said to represent for the countries a 
shameful admission to the world of the government’s inability to care of its own, the loss of a vital 
national asset, and perhaps the ultimate example of the exploitation by rich nations of the poor nations 
of the world.” Id. A common objection to intercountry adoptions is that the practice “represent[s] the 
destruction of [the childrens’] cultural and ethnic heritage, and [their] subjection to a life permeated by 
ethnic and racial discrimination.” Id. at 10-30, 10-31. Various governments have responded with 
creating policies to address problems with “baby-selling” scandals, hostility towards intercountry 
adoption, and anti-American sentiment. Id. at 10-31.  
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proponents, and the annual rate of intercountry adoptions is escalating.129 
The rights of biological parents must be protected in the face of this 
growing trend. 
The Hague Convention130 establishes safeguards to protect the best 
interests of the child during an intercountry adoption.131 It demands that 
biological parents are informed of the effect of the adoption, and that they 
give their consent in writing.132 While the Hague Convention specifically 
mentions the rights of the child in the adoption process, it fails to grant any 
affirmative rights to the biological parents, including the right to revoke 
their consent.133  
The IAA134 also is designed to protect the child’s best interests in an 
intercountry adoption.135 Several provisions of the IAA evidence the 
importance of consent in the adoption.136 The IAA requires that the 
consent to the adoption be voluntary, written, and irrevocable.137 The IAA 
explicitly denies biological parents any rights under the Act after the 
adoption is completed.138 Thus, the IAA also denies biological parents the 
right to revoke their consent.139  
Contrary to the Hague Convention and the IAA, biological parents in 
domestic adoptions under U.S. state law are afforded limited rights.140 
Valid consent is clearly important in U.S. state law.141 However, U.S. state 
 129. Id. Parents who want to adopt internationally have “created parent support organizations 
within the United States which advocate and seek to facilitate international adoption, and have pressed 
adoption agencies to develop programs abroad.” Id. “The most powerful arguments for international 
adoptions relate to the plight of the poor children of the poor nations of the world. Millions of these 
children are growing up without homes and without decent food, shelter, medical treatment, or adult 
care and companionship.” Id. at 10-32. “International adoption can provide part of the solution to the 
current problem, by bringing adults who are eager and able to provide homes together with the 
children who need them.” Id.  
 130. Hague Convention, supra note 16. 
 131. Id. art. 1. 
 132. See discussion supra in Part I. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–14954. 
 135. Id. § 14901. 
 136. See discussion supra in Part II. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See discussion supra in Part III. 
 141. Id. See also HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 8-11.  
The consent of the biological parent or guardian of the child must be obtained before a valid 
adoption can take place, unless there has been a waiver or forfeiture of parental rights . . . . 
Therefore, [i]f it can be shown that the biological parent or guardian did not consent to the 
adoption, there may be sufficient grounds upon which to set it aside. 
Id. “In order for a biological parent to have given a valid consent to the adoption, there must be 
compliance with the statutory requirements governing consent . . . . There is authority for strictly 
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law also affords the biological parents the right to a waiting period after 
the adoption, during which they can revoke their consent.142 The right to 
revoke consent is not absolute.143 Rather, for biological parents to revoke 
their consent, they must comply with time periods and specific 
circumstances.144 
The Adoption Law (P.R.C.),145 like the Hague Convention and the 
IAA, is designed to protect the best interests of the child.146 Consent is 
required, but the specific form of the consent is not clear.147 The Adoption 
Law (P.R.C.) provides several means to terminate the adoptive 
relationship.148 Under the Adoption Law (P.R.C.), both the adoptive and 
biological parents must agree to end the adoptive relationship, or the 
adoptive parents must be found to have mistreated the child.149 Unlike 
U.S. state law, the text of the Adoption Law (P.R.C.) contains no statutory 
waiting period for biological parents to unilaterally revoke their consent to 
the adoption.150  
U.S. state law is unique in providing at least minimal protections for 
the rights of biological parents. Perhaps this is a result of the concepts of 
liberty and fundamental rights that ring throughout our constitutional law 
jurisprudence.151 In order to protect parents’ fundamental rights, and in the 
construing consent requirements in order to protect the rights of biological parents.” Id. at 8-21. 
 142. See supra note 24. 
 143. Id. See also HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 8-13, 8-14. Even 
in states that favor biological parents’ right to revoke consent, “that right is not without limits. It has 
generally been held that consent may not be withdrawn arbitrarily without careful scrutiny by the 
courts.” Id. (footnotes omitted). Usually an adoption will proceed over the biological parents’ 
objection if “the child is doing well with the adoptive parents and the biological parent has no better 
reason for revoking than temporary depression, change of mind, or other similar grounds.” Id. at 8-17. 
 144. See supra note 24. See also HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 8-
8.1. “A biological parent will generally be deemed to have standing to contest the adoption, unless the 
parent’s rights have been previously terminated in an appropriate judicial proceeding.” Id.  
 145. Adoption Law (P.R.C.), supra note 84. 
 146. Id. art. 2. 
 147. See discussion supra in Part IV. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 8-8.13. “To date, federal 
courts have not found that prospective adoptive parents or foster parents have a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in continuing to parent children for whom they have served as de facto 
parents.” Id. In addition, federal courts have not found “that children have a constitutionally protected 
right to be parented by anyone other than their biological parents, unless their parents are deceased or 
are judicially determined to be unfit.” Id. In addition, “[s]ome judges have even argued that strict 
compliance with consent requirements . . . may even be constitutionally mandated, because the legal 
consequences of a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights are the same as those resulting from an 
order of involuntary termination, which warrants constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 8-21 to 8-22 (footnotes 
omitted).  
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interests of fairness and consistency, international adoption laws should be 
amended to enable biological parents, for a limited amount of time after 
the adoption, to revoke consent to the adoption of their child. Laws that 
allow for a limited revocation of consent are by no means excessive; they 
simply provide a necessary protection for the biological parent-child 
relationship. There is no right more fundamental than the right of parents 
to protect and care for their children, and this right should be preserved 
and protected in intercountry adoptions.  
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